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The New EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive: Farewell to transparency of UK trusts  
By 
Dr Simone Wong 




The 4th EU Money Laundering Directive, i.e., 'LUHFWLYH (8  KHUHDIWHU ¶4AMLD·, 
came into force on 26 June 2015, and Member States were required to transpose the Directive 
into national law by 26 June 2017. One of the key aims of the 4AMLD is to enhance 
transparency and prevent the use of anonymity of offshore companies and accounts for the 
purposes of money laundering. There is further a shift in emphasis in the new Directive towards 
a risk-based approach, and obliged entities, such as, credit institutions, financial institutions and 
Trust and Company Service Providers (TCSPs), are required to undertake appropriate steps to 
identify and assess the risks of money laundering in their dealings with customers. In addition, 
the 4AMLD imposes an obligation on Member States to maintain a central register for beneficial 
ownership information of not only corporate and other legal entities but also trusts and other 
legal arrangements similar to trusts. Article 31 of the 4AMLD requires trustees of an express 
trust to obtain adequate, accurate and up-to-date information on beneficial ownership relating to 
the trust. This includes information about the settlor, the trustee(s), the protector of the trust (if 
any), the beneficiaries or class of beneficiaries, and any other natural persons who may exercise 
effective control over the trust.  
The 4AMLD was transposed into UK law through the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing 
DQG 7UDQVIHU RI )XQGV ,QIRUPDWLRQ RI WKH 3D\HU 5HJXODWLRQV  KHUHDIWHU ¶Money 
Laundering Regulations · ZKLFK FDPH LQWR IRUFe on 26 June 2017. This paper seeks to 
consider the potential impact of the 4AMLD on trusts in the UK, particularly the collection and 
disclosure of information regarding beneficial ownership of express trusts as well as the 
maintenance of a central register. The requirement on trustees to collect and make accessible 
information about the trust and the so-called ¶beneficial owners· is aimed at making trust 
arrangements more transparent but seems at odds with the notion of a trust being a private and 
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confidential relationship. Where the express trust generates tax consequences, the 4AMLD 
requires that beneficial ownership information be held in a central register. Registration of trusts 
is not novel in the UK since trusts generating tax consequences are required to be registered with 
HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) even prior to the Money Laundering Regulations 2017.  
Shortly after the 4AMLD came into force, the European Commission began working on a set of 
proposals to amend the 4AMLD in order to take a stricter approach towards tackling not only 
anti-money laundering and countering financing of terrorism but also other financial crimes, 
such as, tax evasion. The draft 5AMLD1 was first published in July 2016. These developments 
took place against the backdrop of some high profile incidents of tax evasion, e.g., the 
publication of the Panama Papers. Coupled with an increasing global desire for greater financial 
transparency reflected in international measures, such as, WKH 2(&'·V &RPPRQ 5HSRUWLQJ
Standard (CRS), the 4AMLD and the amendments proposed by the 5AMLD are part of this 
trend.  
However, the demand for greater financial transparency may potentially conflict with notions of 
privacy and confidentiality. John Riches, for instance, observes in 2013 as follows:2 
[I]n the past two decades there has been a paradigm shift in the view of policy makers and 
legislators to the appropriate boundaries that exist with respect to what is the legitimate 
ERXQGDU\RISULYDF\DQGFRQILGHQWLDOLW\RIDSHUVRQ·VILQDQFLDO affairs. The new imperative is 
WRFUHDWHDPRUHWUDQVSDUHQWHQYLURQPHQW« 
ThLV¶QHZLPSHUDWLYH·LVUHIOHFWHGE\WKH5AMLD·VSURSRVHGwidening of both the recording of 
and access to beneficial ownership information in central registers. For the purposes of this 
paper, the focus is on trusts. This expansion of financial transparency raises concerns about how 
the processing of more financial information and the wider access to such information about 
trusts is to be reconciled with rights to privacy and confidentiality.  At present, the UK has just 
implemented 4MDL. Given 8.·Vcommitment to increasing financial transparency, it is likely 
that, notwithstanding Brexit, further changes along the lines proposed by the 5AMLD will be 
implemented by the UK once that Directive comes into force.    
                                                     
1 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on 
the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing and 





The issues discussed in this paper are not intended to be exhaustive. The paper focuses on, 
firstly, the salient articles of the 4AMLD that apply to trusts and the changes brought about by 
the Money Laundering Regulations 2017 as a result of the transposition of the 4AMLD into UK 
law. It then considers the amendments to the 4AMLD being proposed by the 5AMLD and, 
relatedly, some of the issues that may potentially arise, particularly relating to privacy and 
confidentiality of beneficial ownership information.  
 
The 4AMLD  
One of the key aims of the 4AMLD is to enhance transparency and prevent the use of 
anonymity of companies, other legal arrangements, such as, trusts, and accounts for the purposes 
of money laundering and terrorist financing. There is further a shift in emphasis in the 4AMLD 
towards a risk-based approach whereby obliged entities, such as, credit institutions, financial 
institutions and Trust and Company Service Providers (TCSPs), are required to undertake 
appropriate steps to identify and assess the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing in 
their business dealings with customers.3 The 4AMLD therefore pushes for greater financial 
transparency on the basis that the availability of accurate and up-to-date information about 
beneficial owners is crucial to tracking criminal activities and preventing opacity through 
criminals hiding their identities behind corporate and other seemingly similar legal structures. It 
imposes an obligation on Member States to maintain central registers that will hold information 
pertaining to the beneficial ownership of corporate and other legal entities.4 As part of a wider 
desire for transparency, the 4AMLD further imposes an obligation on trustees to obtain and 
hold information RQ ZKDW LV WHUPHG DV ¶EHQHILFLDO RZQHUVKLS· RI WKH WUXVW. The information 
required broadly covers persons who provided the trust funds/assets, administer and manage the 
trust, have or may have effectively control over the trust, and have or may potentially have a 
benefit from the trust.5 The 4AMLD further requires Member States to hold the beneficial 
ownership information on trusts that generate tax consequences in a central register.6 
There are some parallels between the reporting of beneficial ownership information under the 
4AMLD and the CRS. For instance, the 4AMLD uses a definition of beneficial ownership that is 
similar to the one used by the CRS. Article 31 of the 4AMLD provides that trustees of an 
                                                     
3 4AMLD, recital (22). 
4 Ibid, recital (14).  
5 Ibid, recital (17) and Article 31(1). 
6 Ibid, Article 31(4). 
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express trust are required to obtain adequate, accurate and up-to-date beneficial ownership 
information relating to the trust which includes information of the following parties: the settlor; 
the trustee(s); the protector of the trust, if any; the beneficiaries or class of beneficiaries; and any 
other natural persons who may exercise effective control over the trust. The CRS also requires 
financial institutions to provide information of reportable accounts of individuals and entities, 
which include trusts. Thus, disclosure of financial information relating to trusts is not unique to 
the 4AMLD. There are, however, differences between the CRS and the 4AMLD. Of particular 
relevance for this paper is the fact that the CRS was conceived and developed as a new single 
standard for the automatic exchange of information for the purposes of fighting tax evasion and 
ensure tax compliance. The scope of the 4AMLD, on the other hand, is broader as its purposes 
are not limited to the narrower remit of tax evasion but rather extends to anti-money laundering 
and countering the financing of terrorism.  The automatic exchange of information under the 
CRS is also confined to exchanges between the tax authorities of participating jurisdictions and 
the information is not made available to the public. The 4AMLD currently restricts access to 
central register information of trusts to law enforcement authorities and Financial Intelligence 
Units (FIUs) as well DV¶REOLJHGHQWLWLHV·IRUWKHSXUSRVHVRIFXVWRPHUGXHGLOLJHQFHFKHFNV7 The 
scope of access, however, is set to change under the 5AMLD which aims to provide wider access 
to such information through public central registers.  
 
Transposition of the 4AMLD into UK law 
The 4AMLD was transposed into UK law as the Money Laundering Regulations 2017 on 26 
June 2017. The Trusts Registration Service, an online registration system, was launched to 
coincide with the coming into force of the Money Laundering Regulations 2017. It replaces the 
previous paper-based Form 41G (Trust) which ceased to be accepted since the end of April 
2017. The new framework will provide a single online register operated by HM Revenue and 
Customs (HMRC) in order for trustees to comply with their reporting obligations.  The 
GHILQLWLRQRI¶EHQHILFLDORZQHU· in the Money Laundering Regulations 2017 follows the 4AMLD, 
i.e., it includes the settlor, trustees, beneficiaries or class of beneficiaries and any other person 
having control over the trust, but omits specific UHIHUHQFHWR¶SURWHFWRU·8 ¶3URWHFWRU·ZDVLQLWLDOO\
included in the ¶beneficial owner· definition when HM Treasury held its consultation on the 
                                                     
7 Ibid, Article 31(4). 
8 See Money Laundering Regulations UHJXODWLRQIRUWKHGHILQLWLRQRI¶EHQHILFLDORZQHU· 
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Money Laundering Regulations 2017.9 HM Treasury does not state explicitly the reason for 
RPLWWLQJ ¶SURWHFWRU· from the final version of the definition in the Money Laundering 
Regulations 2017.10 It may be that reference to ¶DQ\RWKHUSHUVRQKDYLQJFRQWURORYHUWKHWUXVW·is 
seen as being sufficiently broad to include protectors. This view may be supported by the 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQJLYHQWRWKHQRWLRQRI ¶FRQWURO· LQWKe Money Laundering Regulations 2017. The 
Regulations provide that ¶FRQWURO· over a trust means having powers that affect the operation 
and/or administration of the trust, such as, dispositive powers over trust property, 
variation/termination of the trust, removing/adding beneficiaries or trustees and directing, 
withholding consent to or vetoing the exercise of a power.11  
The requirement to report beneficial ownership information about a trust applies D ¶UHOHYDQW
WUXVW·, i.e., an express trust that is liable to pay any of the taxes listed in regulation 45(14) of the 
Money Laundering Regulations 2017, such as, income tax, capital gains tax, non-resident capital 
gains tax, inheritance tax, stamp duty land tax or stamp duty reserve tax. The Money Laundering 
Regulations 2017 sub-GLYLGHV ¶UHOHYDQWWUXVW· LQWRWZRFDWHJRULHV7KHILUVW LVD ¶UK trust·. This 
refers to UK-resident trusts which are primarily determined by the residence status of the 
trustees and/or the settlor rather than the situs of trust assets. The second is a trust anywhere in 
the world, i.e., a non-UK resident trust which either receives income from a UK source or has 
assets in the UK.12 $ WUXVWZRXOGEH D ¶8. WUXVW· IRU WKHSXUSRVHVRI WKH Money Laundering 
Regulations 2017 where either all the trustees are, or at least one of them is, resident in the UK, 
and the settlor was resident and domiciled in UK when the trust was set up or when he or she 
added funds to the trust.13 Where the trustee or settlor is a corporate entity, it is resident in the 
UK where it is a UK corporate body. A trustee or settlor who is an individual will be resident in 
the UK if he or she is liable for any of the taxes listed in regulation 45(14).14  
The Money Laundering Regulations 2017 sets out in regulation 44 the obligations of trustees in 
relation to the provision and maintenance of beneficial ownership information. Trustees are 
required to maintain accurate and up-to-date written records of beneficial ownership, and to 
retain those records for five years after the date of final distribution. The information required 
                                                     
9 See HM Treasury, Consultation on the transposition of the Fourth Money Laundering Directive (September 2016), para 10.15 
available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/553409/4mld_final_15_sept_20
16.pdf accessed 15 June 2017.  
10 See HM Treasury, Money Laundering Regulations 2017: Consultation (26 June 2017), para 9.2, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/money-laundering-regulations-2017/money-laundering-
regulations-2017#beneficial-ownership accessed 15 June 2017.  
11 Money Laundering Regulations 2017, regulation 6(2). 
12 Ibid, regulation 42(2)(e). 
13 Ibid, regulation 42(2)(c) and (d). 
14 Ibid, regulations 42(3)(a) and (b). 
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from the trustees about the trust and beneficial ownership involves disclosure of a range of what 
would otherwise be confidential information about the trust. 15 Firstly, specific information about 
the trust itself must be provided, such as, the name of the trust, the date the trust was set up, 
account statements and value of assets, WKH WUXVW·V FRXQWU\ RI UHVLGHQFH IRU WD[ SXUSRVHV, a 
contact address for the trustees, and the names of any legal, financial or tax advisers to trustees.16  
There must also be full disclosure of the so-called ¶EHQHILFLDO RZQHUV· Where the beneficial 
owner is an individual, the information required from the trustees include: WKHLQGLYLGXDO·Vname; 
NI number/tax reference; usual residential address and where it is a non-UK address, details of 
passport/ID; date of birth; and the nature of LQGLYLGXDO·V role within the trust.17 Information 
regarding the description of the class of persons who are beneficiaries, not all of whom have 
been determined, or potential beneficiaries should also be provided.18 This would include, e.g., 
beneficiaries of a discretionary trust who are not named individually but described as a class and 
even beneficiaries who are named in letters of wishes from the settlor, regardless of whether a 
distribution has been made to them.19 Where beneficial owners are legal entities, the information 
required includes: WKH HQWLW\·V corporate/firm name; tax reference; registered/principal office; 
legal form and governing law; its name on companies register, country and registration number; 
and its role within the trust.20  
With respect to the meaning of ¶express trust· WKH 4AMLD is silent on the precise scope of 
express trusts caught by the definition. While it is clear that the 4AMLD excludes from its scope 
RWKHUW\SHVRIWUXVWVHJUHVXOWLQJDQGFRQVWUXFWLYHWUXVWV¶H[SUHVVWUXVW·FRXOGH[WHQGWRRWKHU
types of express trust, such as, statutory trusts. For instance, under English property law, a 
statutory trust (trust of land) is created when legal title to land is conveyed to more than one 
person. The legal co-owners hold title under a non-severable joint tenancy and the number of 
joint tenants is limited to four.21 Given the scale of co-ownership of land, the application of 
Article 31 of the 4AMLD to trusts of land would be problematic if a broad interpretation of 
¶H[SUHVV WUXVW· ZHUH WR EH WDNHQ DV WKH VFRSH RI WKH GHILQLWLRQ PLJKW be over-inclusive. At a 
                                                     
15 Ibid, regulation 45. 
16 Ibid, regulation 45(5). 
17 Ibid, regulation 45(6). 
18 Ibid, regulation 45(8). 
19 HMRC has, however, clarified that information of individual beneficiaries named in letter of wishes would not be 
UHTXLUHGLIWKH\ZHUHQDPHGDVDFODVVRIEHQHILFLDULHV6HH(PLO\'HDQH¶+05&FRQVXOWDWLRQRQ$0/'
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ·7KH67(3%ORJ$SULODYDLODEOHDWhttps://blog.step.org/2017/04/06/hmrc-consultation-
on-4aml-implementation/ accessed 3 July 2017.   
20 Money Laundering Regulations 2017, regulation 45(7). 
21 Law of Property Act 1925, ss 1(6) and 36. 
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practical level, that would place an untenable burden on trustees, including trustees of trusts of 
land, to comply with the 4AMLD reporting obligations.  
The UK JRYHUQPHQW·Vview is that, for the purposes of the Money Laundering Regulations 2017, 
¶express trust· should be taken to mean ¶a trust that was deliberately created by a settlor by 
expressly transferring property to a trustee for purposes of holding it on trust·.22 At the close of 
the Consultation, the Treasury clarified that ¶e[SUHVVWUXVWV· would exclude statutory, resulting or 
constructive trusts.23 A further question is ZKHWKHU ¶H[SUHVV WUXVW·ZRXOGDSSO\ WR WHVWDPHQWDU\
trusts, thus requiring beneficial ownership information on those trusts to be reported under the 
Money Laundering Regulations 2017. The Treasury confirms in its Consultation outcome report 
that express trusts will cover not only inter vivos but also testamentary trusts. Beneficial ownership 
information will therefore have to be reported to the HMRC where an express trust created in a 
will generates a tax consequence.24 The understanding of ¶H[SUHVV WUXVW· in English law may, 
however, be more nuanced. For instance, a will might provide for a secret trust. When a testator 
dies and as part of the probate process, his will becomes a public document and is open to 
public scrutiny as copies of wills can be obtained from the courts by paying the requisite fee.25  
Secret trusts are often made due to the testator not having decided what bequests to make and to 
who at the time of making the will and/or his or her desire to avoid making public who the 
beneficiaries are. This is because the existence of the trust as well as the beneficiaries will not be 
evident on the face of the will. There is academic debate about the precise nature of secret trusts, 
particularly fully secret trusts, i.e., whether these trusts are constructive or express trusts. If one 
adheres to the fraud theory for the recognition of a secret trust, the trust would fit more neatly 
into the category of constructive trusts.26  In that case, it may be argued that provision for a 
secret trust in a will would not require beneficial ownership information on the trust to be 
reported. On tKHRWKHUKDQGWKH¶RXWVLGHRIWKHZLOO·WKHRU\, which is the modern analysis that 
has gained greater traction within legal discourse, would classify a secret trust as an express 
trust.27 That means that a secret trust would equally be caught by the reporting obligations of the 
Money Laundering Regulations 2017. The requirement to report beneficial ownership 
                                                     
22 HM Treasury (n 10) para 9.2. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid, para 9.2. 
25 There seems to be an innate public curiosity about how wealthy celebrities are and what testamentary bequests 
they have made when they die. Examples of such public curiosity can be seen from details of wills being published 
in newspapers after the death of well-known personalities, such as, Princess Diana in 1997 and David Bowie in 
2016.     
26 McCormick v Grogan (1869) LR 4 HL 82; Blackwell v Blackwell [1929] AC 318.  
27 Re Snowden [1979] 2 All ER 172. 
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information on a secret trust, however, would contradict the very purpose of the creation of a 
secret trust in the first place: to keep the trust and its beneficiaries away from prying eyes!  
Given the personal and confidential nature of the information required from trustees, the Money 
Laundering Regulations 2017 provides protection against liability for disclosure of information 
which is otherwise protected by a duty of confidentiality.28 Earlier discussions between STEP 
and HMRC in the earlier part of 2017 indicates that HMRC had, at that time, yet to clarify 
whether it would be necessary to submit updates in following years where trust is dormant or has 
not generated any tax consequences.29 This seems to be clarified in regulation 45(3) of the Money 
Laundering Regulations 2017 which provides that trustees of a taxable trust are required to 
update the register information for each year that the trust generates a UK tax consequence by 
31 January after the end of that tax year rather than on an automatic annual basis. For the 
present, the Money Laundering Regulations 2017 provides that the beneficial ownership 
information relating to trusts will only be accessible to law enforcement authorities and FIUs of 
the UK and any EEA state. 
 
The proposed changes in the 5AMLD: Transparency v Privacy 
Against the backdrop of scandals like the Panama Papers, the European Commission published 
the proposed amendments to the 4AMLD on 5 July 2016 KHUHDIWHU¶WKH$0/'·.30 Since then, 
there have been extensive discussions on the European &RPPLVVLRQ·VSURSRVDOVwhich led to the 
publication of several Presidency compromises. The latest compromise text of the 5AMLD was 
published on 13 December 2016 KHUHDIWHU ¶WKH UHYLVHG $0/'.31 The revised 5AMLD is 
aimed at facilitating even greater financial transparency. One of the ways in which the revised 
5AMLD seeks to do this is by providing authorities and FIUs with timely and unrestricted access 
to beneficial ownership information. For instance, wider powers are to be given to FIUs in terms 
of access to beneficial ownership information. The Commission states that unfettered access to 
information is essential to ensure illicit flows of funds are properly traced and detected. To 
facilitate this, the proposed amendments provide for a shift from investigation-based access, 
                                                     
28 Money Laundering Regulations 2017, regulation 44(7). 
29 Deane (n 19).  
30 Available at:  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016PC0450&from=EN  
accessed 13 June 2017. 
31 The latest compromise text of 13 December 2016 is available at: 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15468-2016-INIT/en/pdf  accessed 17 June 2017. It 
supersedes the previous compromise text of 25 November 2016 available at 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14884-2016-INIT/en/pdf  accessed 15 June 2017. 
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triggered by suspicious transactions, to intelligence-based access for FIUs.32 That means that 
FIUs would be permitted to have access to beneficial ownership information held in registers 
even when there is no suspicion of any wrongdoing. With respect to trusts, this drive for greater 
financial transparency has translated into an extension of the requirement for the reporting of 
beneficial ownership information to all express trusts, regardless of whether they have generated 
any tax consequences.33 The revised 5AMLD therefore seeks to, amongst other things, enhance 
the accessibility of beneficial ownership information.34  
The revised 5AMLD further provides for greater financial transparency through the 
implementation of public registers. According to the European Commission, a justification for 
enhancing access to beneficial ownership information on both corporate entities and trusts is 
that understanding such information is necessary for mitigating the risk of financial crime and 
formulating prevention strategies. The amendments would further bring about an alignment of 
the beneficial ownership registers on trusts with corporate entities in terms of transparency and 
publicity. The Commission explains that compulsory (public) access to beneficial ownership 
information will enable greater scrutiny by civil society, which would in turn assist in the 
preservation of public trust in the integrity of business dealings and the financial system, i.e., 
generating market and investor confidence.35 This would include scrutiny by, for instance, 
investigative journalists and civil society organizations (e.g., non-governmental organisations, 
such as, Tax Justice Network), which would in turn provide an additional layer of monitoring 
and policing. A further argument made in favour of SXEOLFDFFHVVLVWKDWLW¶IDFLOLWDWHVWKHWLPHO\
and efficient availability of information for financial institutions as well as authorities, including 
DXWKRULWLHVRIWKLUGFRXQWULHV·.36 In order to achieve this, central registers must be interconnected 
via the European Central Platform.37 
Given that financial institutions and authorities are permitted to have access to beneficial 
ownership information under the 4AMLD, it is unclear why and how having public registers 
would necessarily add to their having access in an even more ¶WLPHO\DQGHIILFLHQW·PDQQHUThe 
drive for public registers seems in part to be politically motivated in that it is aimed at appeasing 
public outrage when scandals relating to tax evasion, money laundering and terrorist financing 
are exposed by the media. The push for public registers might be seen therefore as a public 
                                                     
32 Revised 5AMLD, recital (14). 
33 See amendment to Art 31 of the 4AMLD proposed by Art 1(10) of the revised 5AMLD. 
34 See Explanatory Memorandum to the 5AMLD, at p. 3. 
35 Ibid, at p.16. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Revised 5AMLD, insertion of a new para. (9) in Article 31 of 4AMLD. 
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relations exercise by states to show a shared consensus of the morally, if not legally, 
reprehensible nature of these types of financial crimes and a zero tolerance towards them. This 
may be reflected by the European Commission stating that the previous ¶PDUNHW DQG LQYHVWRU
FRQILGHQFH·UDWLRQDOHIRULQFUHDVLQJWUDQVSDUHQF\RIEHQHILFLDORZQHUVKLSLQIRUPDWLRQmust pave 
the way for greater public scrutiny. Increasing public access to beneficial ownership would, 
according to the Commission, serve to prevent the misuse of corporate entities and trusts 
through enhanced scrutiny. This panders to the increasing demands of only particular sectors of 
the public who are interested in gaining greater access to such information which they would not 
otherwise have.  
The proposed expansion of public access to beneficial ownership information on trusts raises a 
number of concerns about the potential tension between the privacy and transparency of a trust. 
This section will examine some of these concerns. The first relates to the conceptual/definitional 
LVVXHVWKDWDULVHZLWKWKHXVHRIWKHWHUP¶EHQHILFLDORZQHUVKLS·WRFDSWXUHDJURXSRILQGLYLGXDOV
who may have very different types of rights and interests in the trust. The second is the 
H[SDQVLRQ RI DFFHVV WR ILQDQFLDO LQIRUPDWLRQ WR WKRVH ZLWK D ¶OHJLWLPDWH LQWHUHVW· 7KLUGO\ WKH
section will consider the privacy and data protection concerns that arise as a result of both the 
increased scope of beneficial ownership information that has to be reported and making such 
information publicly available.  
 
(i) 7KH¶EHQHILFLDORZQHUVKLS·FRQXQGUXP 
The notion of ¶bHQHILFLDO RZQHUVKLS· UHODWHV WR WKH ULJKWV WKDW RQH KDV WR VSHFLILF SURSHUW\ LQ
equity even though legal title to that property is held by someone else (the trustee). This 
separation of legal and equitable title means that the equitable owner has the right to the 
economic benefit of the property. For instance, Aitkens LJ in Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria 
states that:38 
[I]n English law an express trust is created when a person (the settlor) directs that certain 
identified property (the trust property) will be held either by him or by others (as trustees) 
under a legal obligation which binds the trustees to deal with that property, which is owned 
by them as a separate fund, for the benefit of another (the beneficiary) who has an equitable 
proprietary interest in the trust property and its fruits from the moment it is created. 
                                                     
38 [2013] EWCA Civ 785, at [37]. 
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There is, however, a debate about ZKHWKHU WKH QDWXUH RI D EHQHILFLDU\·V LQWHUHVW LV in fact in 
personam or in rem. Earlier FDVHV WHQGHG WR YLHZ WKH EHQHILFLDU\·V LQWHUHVW DV EHLQJ D right to 
compel the trustee to perform the trust in accordance with its terms and to remedy any loss or 
harm suffered as a result of a breach by the trustee. We therefore see the development of 
HTXLWDEOHSULQFLSOHVVXFKDVWKH¶EHQHILFLDU\SULQFLSOH·ZKLFKUHTXLUHVKXPDQEHQHILFLDULHVIRUD
valid private trust to be created so that they are able to police and ensure performance by the 
trustees of their obligations.39 7KLVYLHZPDNHV WKHEHQHILFLDU\·V ULJKWXQGHU WKH WUXVWDNLQ WRD
right in personam.  
Yet, categorising WKH QDWXUH RI WKH EHQHILFLDU\·V LQWHUHVW as being personal may not be wholly 
accurate:HVHHKRZWKHEHQHILFLDU\·VLQWHUHVWKDVtaken on a proprietary aspect which enables 
that interest to be enforceable against the world except a bona fide purchaser for value. This type 
of SURSULHWDU\DQDO\VLVRIDEHQHILFLDU\·V LQWHUHVWcan be seen in situations dealing with, e.g., the 
EHQHILFLDU\·VULJKWWo trace or follow assets when there is a misappropriation of trust property,40 
and for disclosure of information about the trust.41 7KH QRWLRQ RI ¶EHQHILFLDO RZQHUVKLS· LQ
relation to beneficiaries therefore does not fit into a neat dichotomous classification of either 
personal or proprietary rights. Instead, the rights of the beneficiaries under the trust, including 
over the trust property, involves a complex set of legal relations and the use of the term 
¶RZQHUVKLS·PD\QRWQHFHVVDULO\EHWKHPRVWDSSURSULDWHZD\RIGHVFULELQJWKHLULQWHUHVWEven if 
beneficiaries are broadly treated as having an equitable proprietary interest in the trust property, 
whether they do in fact have such a vested equitable interest for the purposes of, say, tax, would 
depend on the type of trust in question. This adds another layer of complexity to pinning down 
precisely the rights of beneficiaries since distinctions are needed between trusts, e.g., fixed and 
GLVFUHWLRQDU\ WUXVWV7RGHVFULEHEHQHILFLDULHVXQGHU DGLVFUHWLRQDU\ WUXVW DV ¶EHQHILFLDO RZQHUV·
would be somewhat stretching the notion of ownership. Pending any distribution of trust 
property to a beneficiary, the orthodox view is that the benefiFLDU\·V interest under the 
discretionary trust lies in having certain rights, particularly the right to be considered by the 
trustee or any donee of powers as a potential recipient, rather than an equitable proprietary 
interest in the trust property.42    
                                                     
39 The classic authority for the beneficiary principle is Morice v Bishop of Durham (1804) 9 Ves 399.  
40 Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 AC102, where Lord Millet (at p 128) stated that ¶the process [of tracing] by which a 
claimant demonstrates what has happened to his property, identifies its proceeds and the persons who have handled 
or received them·HPSKDVLVDGGHG 
41 5H/RQGRQGHUU\·V6HWWOHPHQW >@&K7KH¶SURSULHWDU\ULJKW·DSSURach taken in Re Londonderry to disclosure and 
its link to what might be classified as trust documents has since been superseded by cases like Schmidt v Rosewood 
>@:/5ZKHUHGLVFORVXUHIDOOVZLWKLQWKHFRXUW·VLQKHUHQWVXSHUYLVRU\MXULVGLFWLRQ  
42 See, e.g., Gartside v IRC [1968] 1 All ER 12; Vestey v IRC (No 2) [1979] 2 All ER 225.  
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It is equally problematic to define the trustee or the settlor as a ¶EHQHILFLDO RZQHU·. While the 
trustee may hold legal title, he holds only nominal ownership in the trust property and does not 
in fact hold any equitable beneficial ownership in the property. The settlor similarly does not 
retain any equitable interest in the trust property once the trust property has been effectively 
transferred to the trustee and the trust is fully constituted. A settlor who has fully divested 
himself of any proprietary interest in the trust property is, strictly speaking, no longer the owner 
of the trust property, whether legal or equitable. The extent to which the settlor might retain 
powers under the terms of the trust so that he is able to exert control over the trust is quite a 
different from and should not be equated with ownership rights. 7KHVHWWORU·VULJKWVWRFRQWURO
the administration of the trust by the use of, e.g., letters of wishes and retention of powers, such 
as, powers of appointment, to remove and/or appoint new trustees, etc, under the terms of trust, 
must be clearly distinguished from ownership.  The instances when the settlor may still have 
VRPHIRUPRILQWHUHVWDV¶RZQHU·LQWKHWUXVWSURSHUW\DIWHUWKHcreation of the trust is when it is a 
self-declared trust (where the settlor then becomes the trustee), or the settlor is named as a 
beneficiary or has not effectively divested his interests, in which case a resulting trust arises in the 
his favour.43 Likewise, a donee of powers or a protector may have wide powers given to them 
under the terms of the trust which enable them to control the administration of the trust. 
However, the orthodox position is that neither the donee nor the protector is treated as having 
any equitable interest, let alone an interest that is tantamount to ownership, in the trust property.  
The extension of the definition of ¶EHQHILFLDORZQHUVKLS· to parties, such as the settlor and the 
donee of powers, may be over-inclusive. The concern here seems more to do with the extent to 
which these parties may be exercising effective control over the trust so as to direct the way in the 
trustees administer the trust and exercise their discretion in distributing or allocating trust assets. 
While control may be a characteristic of ownership, whether legal or equitable, in that an owner 
is permitted to exercise control over his property, control per se is not necessarily equivalent to 
having ownership rights.44 The adoption of a loose GHILQLWLRQ RI ¶EHQHILFLDO RZQHUVKLS· that 
conflates ownership and control obscures the substantive nature of beneficial ownership in the 
context of trusts.  
                                                     
43 See, e.g., Vandwevell v IRC [1967] 2 AC 291. 
44 See, e.g., cases involving expropriation of property under Art 1 of Protocol 1 (right to peaceful enjoyment of 
possessions) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, such as: 
Marckx v Belgium (1979) 2 EHRR 330; Kopecky v Slovakia (2005) 41 EHRR 43; Papamichalopoulos v Greece (1993) 16 
EHRR440; Vasilescu v Romania (1998) 28 EHRR 241. These cases indicate the distinction between control and 
ownership. They illustrate the severable concepts of control and ownership, and how the loss of control of assets 
could be an indicator of a loss of peaceful enjoyment of assets in which one has proprietary rights, without 
necessarily a loss of ownership rights.  
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This conflation of ownership and control stems in part from an attempt to equate trusts with 
corporate vehicles. One thing that shareholders and beneficiaries seemingly have in common is 
that they are able to distance themselves as owners of assets, which results in their creditors 
being excluded from those assets in the event of their insolvency. The creation of trust registers 
in order to enhance transparency has in part been fuelled by arguments that trusts are in fact 
similar to corporate entities as they allow for separation of ownership between different persons. 
However, trusts are viewed with greater suspicion due to their ability to be less transparent and 
IRUWUXVWSURSHUW\WREHDVVRPHDUJXH¶RZQHUOHVV·RUIRURZQHUVKLSWREHKHOGLQOLPER45 This 
makes trusts vulnerable to abuse and misuse and, as the arguments goes, there should be thus 
equivalent treatment of companies and trusts in order to curb such abuse. The drive then is to fit 
trusts within a regulatory mould that primarily deals with corporate entities.  
Others, however, question the equivalence of a trust and a corporate entity.  Goldsworth, for 
instance, argues that the LQFOXVLRQ RI WUXVWV LQ WKH 2(&'·V UHSRUW RQ WKH DEXVH RI FRUSRUDWH
vehicles is misleading and a mistake. He states as follows:46   
By including trusts amongst corporate vehicles (even if the definition problem is ignored) 
practical and theoretical problems immediately arise. The emphasis on beneficial ownership 
and control of corporate vehicles suggests that the beneficial ownership of shares in a 
company which allows control of that company is equivalent to some form of beneficial 
ownership and control of a trust.  
While there is no lack of consensus that trusts can potentially be abused and misused, there is 
significant difference of opinion as to the necessity for as well as scope of transparency and 
registration of information on trusts.47 It is therefore necessary to exercise caution with pushing 
through even further a political agenda for transparency where there is increasing alignment of 
trusts and corporate entities, without more careful consideration of their practical and legal 
differences.      
                                                     
45 See, e.g., Andres Knobel, Trusts: Weapons of Mass Injustice? (Tax Justice Network, 13 February 2017) available at 
http://www.taxjustice.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Trusts-Weapons-of-Mass-Injustice-Final-12-FEB-
2017.pdf  accessed 15 June 2017. 
46 -RKQ*ROGVZRUWK¶7UXVWVDQGWKH0LVXVHRI&RUSRUDWH 9HKLFOHVIRU,OOLFLW3XUSRVHVWKH2(&'·VYLHZH[DPLQHG·
(2001) 7(9) Trusts & Trustees 15, 16. 
47 6HHHJ)LOLSSR1RVHGD¶&DXJKWLQWKHFURVVILUHEHWZHHQSULYDF\DQGWUDQVSDUHQF\·Trusts & Trustees 
'DYLG5XVVHOODQG7RE\*UDKDP¶0DLQWDLQLQJWKHUDJHWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ·VDWWDFNRQWUXVWVDWKRPHDQG
DEURDG·Trusts & Trustees DQG¶7UXVWV:HDSRQVRI0DVV,QMXVWLFHRU,QVWUXPHQWVRI(FRQRPLF
3URJUHVV"·Trusts & Trustees 363-RKQ5LFKHV¶%H\RQGWD[WUDQVSDUHQF\VHFUHF\SULYDF\DQGVHFXULW\·
(2017) 23(1) Trusts & Trustees 115. 
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In order to reduce the conceptual/definitional confusion, it would be useful for the Money 
Laundering Regulations 2017 to provide DFOHDUHUGHILQLWLRQRI¶EHQHILFLDORZQHUVKLS·IRUWUXVWV 
that draws a sharper distinction between notions of ownership and control. The need for such 
distinction is not merely a matter of semantics or being pedantic. Where a settlor continues to 
exert wide, and even unfettered, control over a trust, it may be argued that the trust might 
possibly be a sham.48 In that case, the settlor might be seen as still being beneficially entitled to 
the trust property.  
It also assumes that beneficiaries of a trust, whether fixed or discretionary, are always able to 
control the trust by being involved in decision-making. An attempt is made to analogise 
EHQHILFLDULHV· LQWHUHVWV XQGHU D WUXVW ZLWK WKH LQWHUHVWV RI VKDUHKROGHUV RI D FRPSDQ\ 7KLV
analogy is both misleading and inaccurate. Shareholders strictly speaking do not own the 
FRPSDQ\·VDVVHWVWKH\GRQRWKDYH legal or beneficial ownership ULJKWVLQWKHFRPSDQ\·VDVVHWV 
What they actually own are the shares in the company. With their ownership of shares, 
shareholders have voting rights and a majority shareholder might be able to control the company 
by, e.g., being appointed onto the Board of Directors and/or using his voting rights at general 
meetings. Unlike a shareholder, a beneficiary does not have a voting right to determine how a 
trustee or a donee of a power of appointment should exercise the discretion given to them. At a 
practical OHYHOWKHH[HUFLVHRIWUXVWHHV·GLVSRVLWLYHGLVFUHWLRQSDUWLFXODUO\LQIDPLO\WUXVWVPay in 
some circumstances be ¶FRQWUROOHG·by someone else, e.g., the settlor. Trustees are nonetheless 
obliged to act in good faith and exercise their discretion, including acting in the best interests of 
all, and not just one or some, of the beneficiaries as well as in an even-handed manner.  
The importance of drawing a distinction between ownership and control of trust property can be 
seen further in divorce cases involving financial relief. The courts may, in some circumstances, 
indirectly attribute beneficial ownership to a beneficiary under a discretionary trust, e.g., where a 
financial relief application is made by the spouse of the beneficiary under ss 23 and 24 of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. In such cases, the court may find that the beneficiary exercises 
effective control over the trust so that the trust assets may potentially be financial resources 
available for redistribution under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.49 However, that finding does 
not mean that the beneficiary, or even the settlor, is the de facto owner of the trust property. 
,QVWHDG WKH FRXUW·V ILQGLQJ PDLQO\ IRUPV ¶judicial eQFRXUDJHPHQW· WR WKH WUXVWHHV WR PDNH D
                                                     
48 However, the courts are generally cautious about holding a trust as a sham. See, e.g., Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd 
[2013] 3 WLR 1.  
49 See, e.g., Browne v Browne [1979] 1 FLR 291; Charman v Charman [2005] EWCA Civ 1606; Tchenguiz-Imerman v. 
Imerman [2014] 2 FLR 939. 
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disposition in favour of the beneficiary so that he or she then has the resources to meet any 
financial relief order made against him or her by the court. Until the WUXVWHH·V exercise of a 
GLVSRVLWLYHGLVFUHWLRQLQIDYRXURIWKHEHQHILFLDU\WKHEHQHILFLDU\·VRQO\ULJKWLVWREHFRQVLdered 
rather than any direct proprietary rights tantamount to ownership of the trust property generally 
or even to the portion that may potentially be allocated. It is thus important to draw clearer 
conceptual distinctions between control and ownership in the definitions used to describe the 
rights and interests of parties to a trust arrangement in order for the appropriate information to 
EHUHSRUWHGUDWKHUWKDQWKHFXUUHQWDSSURDFKRI¶RQHVL]HILWVDOO· 
 
(ii) Meaning of ¶Legitimate LQWHUHVW· 
The proposed amendments in the 5AMLD initially sought to provide full public access to 
beneficial ownership on trusts.50 The scope of public access was subsequently diluted in the 
revised 5AMLD WRPHPEHUVRIWKHSXEOLFZKRKDYHD¶OHJLWLPDWHLQWHUHVW·51  Beneficiaries, and 
even potential ones, may often have an interest in getting hold of information about a trust.  
However, the wider public access to beneficial ownership information being proposed by the 
5AMLD will not be of much assistance to beneficiaries seeking more information about the trust 
XQOHVVWKH\DUHDEOHWRGHPRQVWUDWHWKDWWKH\KDYHD¶OHJLWLPDWHLQWHUHVW·In the compromise text 
on the 5AMLD of 25 November 2016, SDUWLHVZLWKD¶OHJLWLPDWHLQWHUHVW·were described as any 
person or organisation who can demonstrate engagement with or proven track record in 
activities related to fighting money laundering and terrorist financing, or ¶associated predicate 
offences· activities.52 Their access was further confined to information relating to the name, date 
of birth and country of residence of beneficial owners.53  
Restricting public access to central register information on trusts to those with a legitimate 
interest might seem like a logical and practical compromise to allay fears of confidentiality and 
privacy breaches. 7KHUHLVQHYHUWKHOHVVDQLVVXHDERXWWKHSUHFLVHPHDQLQJRI¶OHJLWLPDWHLQWHUHVW·
The meaning of ¶OHJLWLPDWH LQWHUHVW·was initially linked with ¶HQJDJHPHQWZLWKRUSURYHQ WUDFN
                                                     
50 See the initial new para (4a) to Art 31 proposed in the 5AMLD.  
51 See revised 5AMLD, recitals (22a) and (35).   
52 ¶$VVRFLDWHGSUHGLFDWHRIIHQFHV· is not defined in the 4AMLD or the 5AMLD but might arguably include criminal 
conduct, such as, corruption, bribery, tax evasion and fraud. See 4AMLD, recital (14) which cites corruption, tax 
crimes and fraud as examples. RecLWDODRIWKHUHYLVHG$0/'DFNQRZOHGJHVWKDWWKHGHILQLWLRQRI¶DVVRFLDWHG
SUHGLFDWHRIIHQFHV·LVQRWKDUPRQLVHGLQWKH(8DQGLVGHWHUPLQHGby the national laws of Member States. That may 
result in differences in, or even a lack of, legal definition but should not prevent FIUs from exchanging information 
with other FIUs.   
53 Cf the wider range of information that trustees are required to provide for the online register under regulation 
45(5) and (6) of the Money Laundering Regulations 2017. 
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UHFRUG·LQDFWLYLWLHVILJKWLQJIRULQVWDQFHPRQH\ODXQGHring but that does not necessarily help to 
resolve the uncertainty of that term.  The revised 5AMLD of 13 December 2016 removed that 
reference and provided in replacement that it should be left to Member States to provide a clear 
rule on and set the conditions for DFFHVVEDVHGRQ¶OHJLWLPDWHLQWHUHVW·54 However, in the absence 
RI FOHDUHU JXLGHOLQHVRQ WKH VXEVWDQWLYHPHDQLQJRI ¶OHJLWLPDWH LQWHUHVW·, there is the danger of 
disparate legal meanings being adopted by Member States which would in turn affect the scope 
of access to information.  
The question of whether a party seeking access to beneficial ownership information has a 
VXIILFLHQW ¶OHJLWLPDWH LQWHUHVW·ZRXOG arguably be one of fact. The precise evidentiary threshold 
that needs to be met in order to satisfy the criteria set for establishing WKH UHTXLVLWH ¶OHJLWLPDWH
LQWHUHVW·is not clear cut. It is also unclear whether there will be adequate scrutiny and evaluation 
by authorities of tKH HOLJLELOLW\ RI SDUWLHV FODLPLQJ D ¶OHJLWLPDWH LQWHUHVW· before access to the 
information is provided to them. There is therefore a concern about policing access by parties 
FODLPLQJ D ¶OHJLWLPDWH LQWHUHVW· LQ RUGHU WR DYRLG RSSRUWXQLVWLF DFFHVV DQ LVVXH that has been 
flagged up by the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS).55 In addition, Member States 
may allow for wider access to register information which means that the transparency net can be 
FDVW HYHQZLGHUEH\RQG WKRVHZLWKD ¶OHJLWLPDWH LQWHUHVW·56 The widening scope of accessibility 
brings with it the related question of balancing transparency with privacy and data protection 
which we turn to next.  
 
(iii) Privacy and data protection concerns  
A trustee owes a duty of confidentiality as a fiduciary. However, that confidentiality duty might 
be waived on public interest grounds or under compulsion of law. Some argue that there may be 
strong policy reasons for permitting disclosure on public interest grounds as the privacy that the 
trust form affords to VHWWORUV DQG EHQHILFLDULHV FDQ EH XVHG DV D ¶FORDN IRU H[SORLWDWLRQ
FRUUXSWLRQ DQG LQMXVWLFH·57 On the other hand, the growing call for increased financial 
transparency that is accompanied by greater disclosure of and access to confidential information 
about a trust causes tension with the fundamental notion of trust privacy. This also raises issues 
                                                     
54 Revised 5AMLD, new para (4a) to Article 31 of the 4AMLD. 
55 (XURSHDQ'DWD3URWHFWLRQ6XSHUYLVRU¶2SLQLRQRQD&RPPLVVLRQ3URSRVDODPHQGLQJ'LUHFWLYH(8
and Directive 2009/101/EC: Access to beneficial ownership information and data protection implicationV·2SLQLRQ
1/2017), available at https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/17-02-02_opinion_aml_en.pdf  accessed 1 
July 2017. 
56 See n 54. 
57 )UDQFHV+)RVWHU¶7UXVW3ULYDF\·-2008) 93 Cornell L Rev 555, 558. See also Knobel (n 45). 
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for the protection of the rights to privacy and data protection of individuals under the Data 
Protection Act 1998 and Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.  
The revised 5AMLD extends the collection of confidential beneficial ownership information 
from a targeted specific basis to a generalised one.58 The generalised basis upon which personal 
data (beneficial ownership information) is being collected comes with the expansion of the policy 
purposes for such collection as well as the processing and use of the information. In terms of 
data protection, two connected principles merit further consideration7KHILUVW LV WKH ¶SXUSRVH
OLPLWDWLRQ· SULQFLSOH DQG WKH RWKHU WKH SURSRUWLRQDOLW\ SULQFLSOH 7KH ¶SXUSRVH OLPLWDWLRQ·
principle is aimed at ensuring that personal data is collected for ¶VSHFLILHGH[SOLFLWDQGOHJLWLPDWH·
purposes.59 The Data Protection Act 1998 echoes this principle by providing in data protection 
SULQFLSOHWKDWWKHFROOHFWLRQRIGDWDKDVWREHIRU¶RQHRUPRUHVSHFLILHGDQGODZIXO·SXUSRVHV 
However, one concern with the revised 5AMLD is its attempt to cover policy purposes that go 
beyond anti-money laundering and countering financing of terrorism. There are other policy 
purposes FDSWXUHG E\ WKH LQFOXVLRQ RI ¶DVVRFLDWHG SUHGLFDWH RIIHQFHV· ZKLFK PD\ LQFOXGH
offences, such as, tax evasion and financial crime. The lack of precision of the scope and extent 
RI ¶DVVRFLDWHGSUHGLFDWHRIIHQFHV· LV IXUWKHU FRPSRXQGHGE\ WKH IDFW WKDW0HPEHU6WDWHVKDYH
different legal definitions of some of these offences.60 It further seeks to create a complex 
information-sharing network comprising different data controllers with different data processing 
purposes. This then raises an LVVXHIRUWKH¶SXUSRVHOLPLWDWLRQ·SULQFLSOHRIGDWDSURFHVVLQJ when 
there is generalised collection of personal data which enables multiple and/or simultaneous 
processing of the data by different controllers and for different policy purposes that may not all 
be compatible.61 As the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) states: 62  
Processing personal data collected for one purpose for another, completely unrelated 
purpose infringes the data protection principle of purpose limitation and threatens the 
implementation of the principle of proportionality.  
The revised 5AMLD, according to the EDPS, will cause uncertainty in terms of the purposes 
pursued and on the data controllers who are processing the data. That would in turn reduce data 
                                                     
58 See n 32. 
59 Article 6(1)(b) of the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC; Article 5(1)(b) of the General Data Protection 
Regulation (EU) 679/2016. 
60 Revised 5AMLD, recital (14a). 
61 See EDPS (n 55) at paras. 29. 
62 Ibid, para. 30. 
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protection safeguards, such as, the proportionality between processing personal data and the 
purposes of such processing.63  
On the other hand, the proportionality principle is a well-established principle which requires 
proportionality between the measure(s) taken that interfere with data protection and the 
purposes sought to be achieved. The proportionality issue raises further concerns. The first is the 
broad approach taken in the revised 5AMLD towards whose information should be collected 
and when that information is required to be disclosed and registered. While the 4AMLD clearly 
took a risk-based approach, the amendments proposed by the revised 5AMDL indicate that risk 
alone might not be sufficient and there are greater calls for ongoing monitoring of certain 
existing customers.64 Risk aside, the revised 5AMLD does not provide clearer criteria for 
identifying which categories of customers would be caught. The second is the ZLGHU¶LQWHOOLJHQFH
EDVHG·DFFHVVLELOLW\RI),8V to beneficial ownership information. As discussed above, the wider 
¶XQIHWWHUHG·DFFHVVWREHSURYLGHGWR),8V would appear to extend and shift their processing of 
personal data from targeted investigation to intelligence gathering and data mining. This shift in 
turn raises questions about the proportionality of the measures contained in the revised 5AMLD 
as they allow greater interference with the privacy of personal data.  
Thirdly, the reporting obligations contained in the revised 5AMLD relating to trusts will mean 
that more information will have to be reported about trusts regardless of whether they generate 
tax consequences and/or pose any effective risk to money laundering, terrorist financing or any 
other associated predicate offences. That, coupled with the creation of public central registers 
where access is given to not only law enforcement authorities and FIUs but also the public, albeit 
on a limited basis, may give rise to an increased potential for issues of proportionality to arise.   
The EDPS, for instance, questions whether the wider access provided by the revised 5AMLD is 
indeed necessary. It argues that, if the policy objective of publicity of beneficial ownership 
information is about detecting and tackling money laundering, terrorist financing and other 
criminal activities, such as, tax evasion, in a timely and efficient manner, this might be equally 
done by ensuring that such information is transmitted to appropriate authorities, without the 
necessity for public access.65 When public access to personal information is granted, there has to 
be careful consideration of the proportionality of the measures providing such access. It would 
VHHPWKDWRQFHDWKLUGSDUW\DOEHLWRQHZLWKD¶OHJLWLPDWHLQWHUHVW·, has access to the information, 
                                                     
63 Ibid, para. (32). 
64 Revised 5AMDL, recital (19). 
65 See, e.g., ECJ judgment of 20 May 2003, in Joined Cases Rechnungshof (C-465/00) v Österreichischer Rundfunk and 
Others and Christa Neukomm (C-138/01) and Joseph Lauermann (C-139/01) v Österreichischer Rundfunk, para 88.   
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the confidential information is arguably within the public domain and thus loses its right to 
protection on the basis of confidentiality. This might be problematic given the lack of clarity in 
the revised 5AMLD in terms of the myriad purposes for processing the data and who amongst 
multiple data controllers should be held accountable. These privacy concerns have therefore led 
the EDPS to express deep concerns about the scope of the revised 5AMLD and its significant 




The increasing commercial use of trusts for wealth management and asset protection has 
undoubtedly raised concerns about the potential for the use and abuse of trusts for money 
laundering, financing terrorism and other financial crimes, such as tax evasion. When high-
profile cases of money laundering or tax evasion are reported in the media, those stories give 
strength to the moral and ethical arguments made for greater transparency and regulation of 
trusts. The 4AMLD and the subsequent amendments proposed by the revised 5AMLD are a 
reflection of the increasing pressure globally for greater financial transparency. The revised 
5AMLD is an ambitious project that seeks to provide greater transparency of both corporate 
entities and trusts and to extend the reporting obligations of parties, such as, trustees. It attempts 
to further align trusts with corporate entities by imposing the requirement for the maintenance 
of a central register for beneficial ownership information on trusts which is accessible to the 
public, albeit on a limited scale. These measures will result in trusts losing some degree of 
privacy. 
There are terminological issues that arise in the 4AMLD and revised 5AMLD, as well as the 
Money Laundering Regulations 2017. Firstly, the choice of WKHWHUP¶EHQHILFLDORZQHUVKLS·is less 
than ideal as it is being used as a shorthand to capture the interests of various parties to the trust 
which may be quite different and are not necessarily ownership rights. Not all of the rights of the 
SDUWLHV GHILQHG DV ¶EHQHILFLDO RZQHUV· ILW QHDWO\ ZLWK RUWKRGR[ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI ¶EHQHILFLDO
RZQHUVKLS·.  It would be useful for sharper distinctions to be made between various rights, 
whether personal or proprietary in nature, of these so-FDOOHG ¶EHQHILFLDO RZQHUV· ,Q DGGLWLRQ
distinctions should further be made between ownership and control. This might help to marked 
out more clearly what particular types of information about the trust should be reported and 
                                                     
66 See EDPS (n 55). 
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when in order to ensure the qualitative usefulness of that information. Secondly, conceptual 
uncertainty equally arises in relation to WKH PHDQLQJ RI ¶OHJLWLPDWH LQWHUHVW·. While the revised 
$0/'OHDYHVWKHPDWWHURIGHILQLQJ¶OHJLWLPDWHLQWHUHVW·ZLWKLQQDWLRQDOODZVWR0HPEHU6WDWHV
different meanings may be adopted. That can lead to legal and conceptual uncertainty about the 
scope and extent of public access which can in turn undermine the objective of increasing global 
transparency and facilitating more efficient sharing of financial information between states.  
The expansion of the reporting obligations and the overall policy purposes, both expressly and 
implicitly stipulated, in the revised 5AMLD has the further potential of raising privacy and 
confidentiality concerns. This is SDUWLFXODU WUXH RI WKH UHYLVHG $0/'·V broader objective of 
VDQFWLRQLQJ ),8V· wider access to beneficial ownership information for the purposes of 
intelligence gathering and analysis. That, coupled with the broader policy purposes of the revised 
5AMLD that extends beyond anti-money laundering and countering terrorist financing to 
¶DVVRFLDWHGSUHGLFDWHRIIHQFHV·DGGVWRWKHFRQFHUQVRISULYDF\RILQGLYLGXDO·s information. The 
revised 5AMLD permits not only more information to be gathered but also for that information 
to be used for multiple purposes and by multiple parties. The collection and access to personal 
information on a generalised rather than specific targeted manner will certainly give rise to 
conflicts with existing data protection principles. Greater clarity is therefore needed as to when 
and how central register information may be appropriately processed and used, including by the 
public, and which parties are to be accountable.  
